


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# **ROME'S GERMAN FRONTIER: Peace Enforcement Precursor or Paradigm?**

**A Monograph  
By  
Major Stuart A. Whitehead  
Armor**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenwoth, Kansas**

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## ABSTRACT

### ROME'S GERMAN FRONTIER: PEACE ENFORCEMENT PRECURSOR OR PARADIGM?

by MAJ Stuart A. Whitehead, USA, 76 pages.

This monograph addresses whether current peace enforcement doctrine (the threat or use of force to compel compliance, in order to maintain or restore peace and support political settlement) is inclusive of historical (ancient) principles. By comparing the Roman frontier experience to contemporary peace enforcement doctrine, the research attempts to identify principles contemporary planners may find useful and which may increase our understanding of the nature of peace enforcement operations.

This monograph first examines current peace keeping doctrine. The analysis includes a discussion of the legal aspects of peacekeeping as defined by the U.N. Charter and highlights the tension between national and universal sovereignty. Also, the nature of peace enforcement operations is examined to include the principle of impartiality, force design and its ability to establish the conditions for political dialogue.

The majority of the monograph addresses the Roman defense of its German frontier. The analysis begins with a background summary of Roman contemporary perspective including: cosmology, *limitatio* and justification for war. The study spans three centuries and examines three types of border security structures. Included in the analysis is a discussion of the organization of space, the evolution of the *limes* and the employment of forces designed to ensure border security.

This monograph identifies several principles which, based upon the Roman experience, continue to apply to contemporary peace enforcement doctrine. These include: the rule of law, operational legitimacy and impartiality. A discussion of campaign design encompasses the use of force, risk and the changing nature of the operational environment. The monograph's findings suggest that peace enforcement is by its nature distinctly different from peace keeping and, while the two types of operations may occur simultaneously and are sometimes compatible, their differences warrant separate consideration, both doctrinally and operationally.

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*There is...no shortage of Bosnia-like potential situations on the horizon. The conscious choices that America and the international community generally make about how these situations are handled will define the new order. There will, thanks to the publicity created by global television, be great temptations to try to alleviate, by the application of military force, numerous situations, most of which cannot be solved by the application of the sword.<sup>1</sup>*

*Donald M. Snow*

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Political scientist Donald M. Snow<sup>2</sup> postulates that the post Cold War period left the United States "lacking a framework of where and when to use force...[causing us] to consider situations on a case-by-case basis where the criteria for evaluation are often vague... The problem of ad hococracy, the only available method when a framework is absent, is that the individual determination may form an unintended pattern that comes to constitute a set of de facto principles of operation, a new set of rules of the game that would not have been adopted through a conscious deliberative process."<sup>3</sup>

In an attempt to remedy this doctrinal shortcoming, the US Army published Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations. However despite a common doctrine, in execution peace operations occur in the context of two competing views of security. On the one hand, the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty represents the "supreme power of the state, exercised within its boundaries, free from external interference."<sup>4</sup> While on the other, the UN Secretary General suggests that "underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole."<sup>5</sup> Future American forces may find themselves conducting *peace enforcement* operations within this contradictory environment of 'national' versus 'universal' sovereignty. Specifically, by enforcing universal sovereignty they may have to "compel [nation state]

compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions" imposed by the United Nations.<sup>6</sup>

If Dr. Snow is correct, the imperative to create a doctrine for peace operations is as important as it is for warfighting. Accordingly, the purpose of this monograph is to investigate the historical (ancient) application or threat of military force to compel compliance, in order to maintain or restore peace and support political settlement. By focusing on the Roman defense of the Central European frontier, from 55 BC to 300 AD, we will learn how the earliest "world power" ensured regional stability despite continual challenge and change. Specifically, we will examine the strategic environment, Rome's objectives, its national strategy and guidance. We will then study the organization and relationship of Rome's armed forces to its national authority and the ways by which Roman military leaders sought to establish the conditions that lead to the attainment of strategic objectives. An understanding of how the Romans designed their campaigns and security structure to suit this unique strategic environment may provide us with "rules" which we then can compare to our present understanding of peace enforcement doctrine.

The monograph begins with a collective analysis of peacekeeping. US Army field manuals, articles written by former peacekeepers, and contemporary literature make up this body of information. The material content extends from the post World War II period to the present, however, references from theory include a much broader scope. Initially we will focus on the genesis, nature and purpose of "peace enforcement" operations, and the motivation of political agencies which feel compelled to execute (or propose) these missions. An analysis of the relationship between *rational* and *objective* will reveal a

broader understanding of *action* and *endstate*. The investigation includes an examination of the legal justification for conducting the missions, as well as constraints and limitations placed upon the dedicated forces. This serves two functions: it will yield theoretical precepts germane to "peace enforcement" and provide a perspective from which we may compare our subsequent analysis of the Roman defense of its North European frontier.

The weight of the monograph includes a survey of documents concerning the nature, intent, objectives, policy, execution and outcomes of Roman operations in what is now territorially Central Europe, generally along the Rhine river. In particular our focus is the border region and "barbarian territory" which straddle the "*Limes*" (the Roman border). Here our examination will uncover the nexus of political, social, economic and military forces as they relate to the strategic purpose and effectiveness of the *Limes*. We will compare the design, organization and conduct of campaigns to the existing security structure and Roman objectives. Also, we shall seek to learn how or if Rome was successful in incorporating "lessons learned" into subsequent operations. This analysis will yield principles which Rome consciously followed in pursuit of regional stability.

By comparing the Roman experience to contemporary peace enforcement doctrine we will uncover similarities and differences between the two. Although dissimilar conditions and the lack of complete knowledge concerning Roman operations may explain some disparity, the research will provide a number of "rules" or principles which staff officers and commanders may find useful in planning *peace enforcement* operations. These findings should provide insight into our contemporary understanding of peace operations, while also suggesting implications for future peace doctrine.

*We must treat peace enforcement as a mission that may involve combat, and acknowledge its limitations while seeking to improve our capabilities. Ultimately, the toughest challenge may be asking and answering hard questions about the purposes, requirements, and resources for proposed missions-and accepting the fact that peace enforcement cannot solve every crisis.<sup>7</sup>*

*Sarah Sewall*

## **II. Theory of Peace Enforcement**

FM 100-23, Peace Operations defines peace enforcement (PE) as: "the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement."<sup>8</sup> This represents a fundamental shift from traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter where "military operations are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties...to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement."<sup>9</sup>

### The UN Charter, National and Universal Sovereignty

As public policy scholar John Hillen<sup>10</sup> points out, peace keeping operations were never intended under the UN Charter, rather Chapter VI "gives the UN the power to mediate international disputes between states and recommend terms of settlement...[thus relying] on the states to carry out voluntarily the decisions of the Security Council."<sup>11</sup> Article 42 of Chapter VII, on the other hand, authorizes the use of military force to enforce UN Security Council mandates with or without the consent of the belligerent parties to "maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>12</sup> Due to Cold War interests, however, the ability to form a multilateral agreement for Chapter VII sanctioned operations materialized only after the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> Historically, Desert

Shield/ Desert Storm, Restore Hope and UNISOM II are the only operations in which the Security Council authorized the use of coercive force under Chapter VII.<sup>14</sup> This recent development may also reflect the impetus and sentiment of the current UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali whose view of "universal sovereignty residing in all humanity" legitimizes involvement in issues which affect the world as a whole.<sup>15</sup> In effect, the UN now assumes a moral responsibility to intervene *where ever* it determines a crisis threatens international peace and security.<sup>16</sup>

This new perspective of a universal ethos presents several practical if not litigious issues. The first concern centers on the UN Charter, where "sovereign nations" are represented equally in a global body politic.<sup>17</sup> Inherent in the Westphalian perspective of national sovereignty is the *immutable* concept of supreme authority within the recognized territorial boundary of the independent nation state.<sup>18</sup> As Snow suggests: "peace-enforcement is likely to involve the violation of state sovereignty, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and thus does not invite the peace enforcers in."<sup>19</sup> In effect, where the "neutral" UN once wielded its symbolic, if not physical, power to arbitrate the disputes of sovereign states, it now allows itself the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the same.

#### The Conduct of Peace Enforcement

The specter of international intrusion is even more disconcerting from the perspective of those nations which perceive the UN as a western puppet, manifested most vividly by disproportionate representation on the UN Security Council. Therefore any decision taken by the UN to embark on peace enforcement missions may result in a loss of

neutrality and perhaps legitimacy in the eyes of an uncooperative belligerent state. The resultant loss of UN legitimacy may only further frustrate attempts to secure negotiations or effect a long-term political solution.

A second issue involves the organization of peace enforcement forces. Like peace keeping, peace enforcement operations are undertaken by coalitions.<sup>20</sup> Traditionally, the UN constructs coalitions of intentionally politically disparate countries in order to present world-wide representation.<sup>21</sup> Under the relatively stable conditions and a permissive atmosphere typical of UN monitoring missions, command and control relationships are seldom stressed in ways which would fracture coalition partnership. Peace enforcement, however, demands the same qualities and attributes required of modern professional armies trained to execute combat missions. Herein lies a major contemporary criticism: "Multinational coalitions must be built on the principle of political unity if ensuing military operations are to succeed."<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, UN forces must be adequately resourced to accomplish their designated goals.<sup>23</sup> Our recent experiences in Somalia underscore the expense of these missions, which are not programmed in the defense budget but for which our military must foot a significant share of the bill.<sup>24</sup> This also highlights the need for the Security Council to review its mandate once forces are committed. As an example, "mission creep" and operational environmental changes may warrant mandate revision.

Lastly, the political nature of the UN appears antithetical to the clearly defined missions and guidance military organizations have come to expect in the planning, preparation and execution of combat operations. For this reason, when President Clinton

addressed the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1993, he broached the following questions concerning the decision to support peace operations: "Does a real threat to international peace and security exist? Does the proposed operation have clear objectives? What financial and human resources would be required and are they available? Are the costs and risks acceptable? Can an end point for the operation be identified?"<sup>25</sup> Domestically, he followed up this theme with the publication of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. In it, he addressed six major issues requiring reform and improvement.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, he acknowledged the need to conduct peacekeeping to "prevent and resolve" regional conflicts "before they pose direct threats to our national security" and that these operations "also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security and economic growth."<sup>27</sup> In effect by recognizing the need, utility and cost for peace operations, the President is urging the UN and our own national leadership to choose our missions wisely. Peace operations are not a panacea.

#### The Nature of Peace Enforcement

Given the UN's tenuous nature both legally and actively to embark on peace enforcement operations, what are these missions and why are nations willing to expend lives and national treasure in their execution? Peace enforcement, unlike warfare, Sarah Sewall argues, "in historical terms-[is] not yet born."<sup>28</sup> They are, in their most basic form, armed interventions which may involve combat.<sup>29</sup> As military missions they may include: "the restoration and maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforce sanctions, establishment and

supervision of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerent parties" to name only a few.<sup>30</sup> However, unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement is typified by a low level of belligerent consent, the necessity to field sufficient combat power to compel or coerce appropriate behavior, and a low need for belligerents to perceive the peace enforcer as impartial.<sup>31</sup> Thus while peace enforcement is not war, it is markedly different from peacekeeping. This "neither fish nor fowl" characteristic is also what makes peace enforcement a particularly difficult challenge.

Peace enforcement is undertaken to "maintain or restore peace" to establish the conditions for successful diplomatic efforts, in pursuit of a long-term political settlement.<sup>32</sup> Intrinsically this suggests a hostile environment, yet one in which the application of force is appropriate for conflict resolution. However, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement, Sarah Sewall warns, "Some conflicts simply cannot be solved by outsiders. Some of the most senseless, tragic violence may be immune to diplomacy."<sup>33</sup> An analysis, to ensure the *effectiveness* of force, is central to PDD 25, as we must have confidence in our ability to achieve definable, decisive results.<sup>34</sup> Yet due to the ultimately political nature of the end state, a peace enforcement strategy must consist of an integrated approach combining diplomatic, informational, military and economic efforts.

Military planners must, therefore, respect the needs of other agencies and coordinate operations accordingly. Operational compatibility with the activities of non-governmental and private volunteer organizations (NGO/PVOs) will further increase operational effectiveness. Peace enforcement creates the conditions under which other

agencies and organizations may flourish, but only after stability is achieved. Then operational responsibility should transition to a separate peace keeping force.<sup>35</sup> Due to the complex "politico-military" environment in which peace enforcement operations are likely to occur, operators will necessarily require a situational awareness and understanding previously not required in traditional combat.

#### Peace Enforcement Doctrine

Doctrinally peace enforcement operations are conducted in phases, beginning with the insertion of combat forces to establish a presence, then transition to support the development of competent civil authority.<sup>36</sup> While a peace enforcement force can accomplish peace keeping missions, normally its replacement by a second peace keeping force signals a transition of phase during the operation.<sup>37</sup> During the conduct of peace enforcement operations, three operational variables are used as a benchmark to assess the suitability of the force and its mission to the nature of the environment: level of consent, level of force and degree of impartiality.<sup>38</sup>

FM 100-23 states that "crossing...the *consent divide* from PK to PE is a policy level decision that fundamentally changes the nature of the operation."<sup>39</sup> This concept of *consent* is critical to understanding the ambiguous nature peace enforcement operations. The moment a commander embarks on a peace enforcement mission, he assumes that consent has been lost to the point that it endangers or no longer permits a peace keeping environment. Therefore a decision to conduct a peace enforcement operation, is a decision to regain regional (local) stability. More to the point, it is a decision to achieve "moral dominance" over those parties which fail to consent to the presence of peace

keeping forces; it is coercion by the threat or use of force. Much as Blainey describes the nature of war as a recognition of relative power,<sup>40</sup> peace enforcement produces an awareness of the peace enforcer's capabilities vis a vis the local party. Critical to the use of coercive force, however, is its appropriate use toward an achievable end state. A war lord offering "tacit" consent, buying time until the withdrawal of peacekeepers, remains a potent destabilizing force. Similarly, belligerent parties "defeated" by peace enforcement forces may no longer view the UN as "impartial." Thus commanders must recognize both armed force limitations and potential impact, and plan accordingly.

Given that the commander selects peace enforcement operations as the proper solution to a destabilized situation or as a preventive measure against escalating hostilities, he must then select a force "sufficient to compel or coerce" the belligerent into submission.<sup>41</sup> This aspect of peace enforcement cuts to the heart of many contemporary debates - "How much is enough?" The minimum sufficient force maxim which applies to peacekeeping operations may be a recipe for disaster in "combat" peace enforcement operations.<sup>42</sup> Commanders must prepare their estimates as they would for combat; for example, they determine the correlation of forces necessary to defeat the opponent and preserve the force.<sup>43</sup> However, as FM 100-23 warns, "the need to employ force may begin a cycle of increasing violence; therefore, commanders must be judicious in employing forceful measures..." Force design, therefore is the physical manifestation of the commander's estimate, reflecting how he chooses to balance the inherent and sometimes contradictory tasks of mission accomplishment, force protection, achievable and sustained end state, and prevention of further destabilization.

Perhaps the most contentious operational variable to address in peace enforcement operations is 'impartiality.' FM 100-23 states that "impartiality, ...may change over time and with the nature of operations. An even-handed and humanitarian approach to all sides of the conflict can improve the prospects for lasting peace and security, even when combat operations are under way."<sup>44</sup> Like consent, however, impartiality is in the eye of the beholder. To the degree that peace enforcement operations may occur according to a negotiated agreement, or as a "promised response" to an act of aggression, they can validate the peace keeper's veracity and commitment. Impartiality and consent are intangibles which can reflect the cultural, political, military and, often personal biases of the belligerent. This necessitates an understanding on the part of the peace enforcement commander of how each belligerent will interpret his actions. He must also discern when his overall activities are viewed as impartial and when they are not; moreover, he must know when he can afford not to be impartial and the consequences. From a practical perspective this may be difficult to accomplish. "Belligerent parties may perceive intelligence gathering as a hostile act"<sup>45</sup> or in a tribal conflict which involves the control of food as a weapon, a policy of "feeding the hungry" may also be viewed as hostile.

FM 100-23 outlines six principles for peace operations: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and legitimacy.<sup>46</sup> With respect to peace enforcement operations, however, the manual points out that the "focused and sustained application of force...[warrant that] the principles of war...be included in the planning process for all peace operations."<sup>47</sup> So it is that doctrinally peace enforcement is "war" disguised as "peace." This dichotomy of nature and purpose between peace enforcement and peace

keeping is significant. "They are not part of a continuum allowing a unit to move freely from one to another... They take place under vastly different circumstances involving the variables of consent, force, and impartiality."<sup>48</sup> "While peacekeeping is the monitoring of an agreement reached with the consent of the parties, peace enforcement does not presume that the conflict has reached a stable balance."<sup>49</sup> Given the contradictory nature of the two operations, can one appropriately set the stage for the other? In short, can coercion create consent? And if the doctrinal principles of one operation reflects an environment different from the other, how are the two joined?

A partial answer to these questions may stem from the doctrinal overlap found between the principles of peace operations and the principles of war. These include: objective and security. In peace operations, our approach is notably different from war planning in that we must define the objective in terms that provide an "understanding of what constitutes success" and recognize that military "aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies."<sup>50</sup> Where combat commanders receive their mission and intent from the national command authority, peace operations begin with a UN Security Council mandate (or US government when acting unilaterally). Significantly, the end state for peace operations is actually part of a larger process linked to diplomatic, economic, informational and humanitarian efforts conducive to conflict resolution.<sup>51</sup> Therefore the selection of a clearly defined, attainable objective and endstate is the foundation upon which the commander can begin to construct an appropriate plan which also allows for a smooth transition from peace enforcement operations to peace keeping.

Proper selection of the objective however, cannot guarantee success. Historically, the legacy of peace keeping operations is their almost uniform failure to advance conflict resolution. In this regard Paul F. Diehl offers four explanations: "(1) the failure to limit armed conflict, (2) the interconnection of peace keeping and negotiation, (3) the creation of a counterproductive environment for negotiations and (4) the inappropriateness of the peacekeeping strategy to the task."<sup>52</sup> These shortcomings are important aspects of campaign design and reflect an uncoupling of peace enforcement operations with their expressed purpose of creating an appropriate environment for political settlement. More important, is Diehl's conclusion: "peacekeeping is not the mechanism to achieve satisfactory diplomatic outcomes...Peacekeeping...may be best suited for use *after* some measure of conflict resolution, rather than the traditional pre-resolution deployment."<sup>53</sup>

Peace enforcement operations therefore are born of frustration - the need to "do something" legally justified by a UN Charter "Chapter VI and a Half" interpretation and philosophically by the Secretary General's concept of "universal sovereignty." These tenuous underpinnings only begin to suggest the whip-lash of potential conflict which may arise from the violation of national sovereignty. Moreover, the implications to unit and command and control design only further portend the creation of a force inappropriate for the mission and used in a manner actually counterproductive to its intended purpose. In this regard we should carefully consider Paul F. Diehl's admonition,

"Peacekeeping operations will assume a prominent role in the next decade and beyond. The extent of their success will vary according to how well decision makers use them, whether decision makers follow their deployment with conflict resolution mechanisms, and the degree to which decision makers can recognize and employ better alternatives."<sup>54</sup>

*"The road goes on and on-and the wind sings through your helmet plum-past altars to legions and generals forgotten. Just when you think you are at the world's end, you see smoke from the east to west as far as the eye can turn, and then under it, also as far as the eye can stretch... one long low, rising and falling, hiding and showing line of towers. And that is the wall!"<sup>55</sup>*

Rudyard Kipling

### III. An Historical Analysis of the Roman Frontier

Before any analysis of the Roman frontier can take place, we must first attempt to see the world, as best we can, through the eyes of a Roman. It is perhaps telling that "no Roman geographic description or map tells us where the boundaries of the empire actually lay."<sup>56</sup> In fact, significant evidence suggests that as much as our modern concept of geographically defined nation states distorts our perspective, contemporary ideas of cosmology and science similarly influenced the Romans.<sup>57</sup>

#### Cosmology

Despite Roman interest in the science of "chorography"<sup>58</sup> they failed to advance cartographic accuracy. Rather, by leaning away from "empirical accuracy" and toward a cosmological approach, the Romans came to view their world in two significant ways.

"First, there was a tendency to underestimate the distance between the center and the periphery. All world maps contained a center of practical, empirical certainty and a periphery of ideological or 'scientific' certainty. But between the two lay large areas of uncertainty. Although the proportions of the world were distorted by the visible shape of the maps on which it was displayed...space and time were expressed in terms of accessibility, as they are in many societies today... The second consequence...was that the unknown regions between the known center and the ideological periphery of Oceanus were perceived in terms not of territory but of power."<sup>59</sup>

In this regard the concept of empire is not defined by a limit, but rather its "expansion stops at the end of the cultivated universe."<sup>60</sup> Associated with this view is the concept of *imperium* - originally "the giving of orders by a general (*imperator*)...exacting

obedience.<sup>61</sup> In a larger sense, however, the Romans applied *imperium* as a concept of world dominance that since the last century of the Republic they believed was inherited from Alexander the Great.<sup>62</sup> In the Aeneid, the poet Virgil formulated Rome's claim to "rule without borders" as bestowed upon them by Jupiter.<sup>63</sup> Yet as Strabo recognized, peoples outside the provinces could receive *clementia* and *amicitia* but "are not worth the cost of occupation because of the weakness of the infrastructure."<sup>64</sup> This "cost-benefit" analysis is particularly striking when we compare Rome's relationship to its Eastern *vis a vis* Western frontier.

### Limitatio

Roman attitudes toward the frontier combined the practice of divination with mensuration.<sup>65</sup> Surveying or *limitatio* was not only, as we would expect, the process of defining space, but also purified an enclosure of land where the boundary stones (*termini*) held significant symbolic and religious significance. In effect, it was a Roman attempt to create order from chaos.<sup>66</sup> Enclosing sacral space also delineated between organized and unorganized space. In this regard the Romans defined two types of boundaries: assigned lands (*arceo* or organized land) and the boundary beyond (*arcifinius-* which protected the organized land), normally a recognizable terrain feature such as a mountain chain or a river.<sup>67</sup> As a result, the Romans created a vehicle by which they could define and assign responsibilities for space. Civil authorities administered the *arceo* while the military were responsible for the *arcifinius*. This process was also linked to *imperium* in that only those with *authority of imperium* could permit boundaries to move forward; thus, increase the *fines of Rome*.<sup>68</sup> (Appendix A.)

### A Justification for War

From the very beginnings of Republican Rome, the citizens were imbued with a belief in their socio-political superiority and a sense of duty to impose their political order on the peoples surrounding them. Roman politicians and writers took pains to emphasize that the desire to rule over these peoples must never originate in avarice or base instincts (to conquer for conquest's sake) but that it must be born out of responsibility, justice and have the interests and benefits of the subdued peoples in mind.<sup>69</sup> This is the theoretical justification of the *imperium*.

Inherent in the concept of *imperium* was the treaty or *foedus*. Treaties were of paramount importance for the purpose of security, some represented reciprocal agreements, while others were clearly more one-sided. Generally, there were two circumstances which warranted the construction of a treaty: "Either Rome made a settlement with a defeated enemy establishing peace and an alliance for the future, or a people not at war with Rome...applied for a military alliance in its own interest."<sup>70</sup> The surrender of a weaker state to Rome as an act of good faith (*fides*) bore with it the "moral obligation" of protection, or in terms of foreign policy, "to justify armed intervention on behalf of a state to which Rome was bound."<sup>71</sup> This term is also significant in that the "kings" of the client state became *amici* (friends) of Rome as well as in their *fides*.<sup>72</sup>

A second related concept is *justum bellum* (legal or justified war). Originated by the Greeks, the Romans embraced the concept by scrupulously adhering to precautions that ensured any war undertaken was indeed just.<sup>73</sup> Integral to the legitimacy of the war was the requirement of *pium*, "in accord with the sanction of religion and the commands

of the gods.<sup>74</sup> The Romans believed that their continued success over time was due to the favor of the gods and the justness of their cause. While scholars argue the extent to which fetial law limited Roman aggressiveness, there is some validity to the notion that the Romans were reluctant to engage in war unless they perceived it as defensive.<sup>75</sup> This justification may have been intended to assuage domestic concerns and garner national support, while in fact the leadership pursued more pragmatic ends. Regardless, Harris provides strong evidence that the process devolved from a formal declaration of war between prospective belligerents to the personal tool of Octavian.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, the procedure is more closely aligned with the offense than an effective defense.<sup>77</sup>

Beyond the justification for war lies its ultimate outcome, a state of non-war. The Romans believed that *pax* and related ideas were "condition[s] that could only result from a successful war."<sup>78</sup> This is important in that the Romans not only failed to recognize peace as a state of non-war, but they believed it must be achieved through either armed intervention or diplomacy. Therefore, the Roman perspective of war as an intricate tapestry of pragmatism, psychological rationalization and disguised self interest. In every campaign, each of these factors would play to a greater or lesser extent, however in terms of the Roman psyche, success obviated concerns over justice. This then represents some of the psychological baggage which the Romans carried throughout the centuries. By understanding their perspective, we may now better study the Roman frontier experience.

### The Frontier

In his much acclaimed (and maligned)<sup>79</sup> study, The Grand Strategy of the Roman

Empire, Edward Luttwak described the commonality between the United States and Rome:

"For the Romans, as for ourselves, the two essential requirements for an evolving civilization were a sound material base and adequate security. For the Romans, as for ourselves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order."<sup>80</sup>

In attempting to bridge ancient and modern strategy, Luttwak synthesized the application of "modern systems analysis to *Limesforschung*," deducing from archeology, historiography and literary sources a coherent view of Roman policy over four centuries.<sup>81</sup>

Although his conclusions concerning the notion of a rational, long term Roman strategy remain the topic of considerable academic controversy, his study remains valuable in that it demonstrates a Roman capability to both understand and successfully wield power within an environment of limited resources.<sup>82</sup> His work is also useful in that it logically organizes time in relationship to the physical manifestation of the frontier. For this reason we will use Luttwak's study as a blue print for our own investigation of Roman policy and regional stability.

### The Limes

The word *limes* is often used synonymously for frontier, however, originally it was a surveying term meaning path or a road "which separated one terrain from another." In a later usage, the term describes roads cut into the wilderness as "routes of penetration into enemy territory."<sup>83</sup> Over time, certain *limes* became lines of communications, ostensibly for military purposes but subsequently also for commercial traffic. Coincidentally, many of the roads were in close proximity to river networks and, in fact, rivers were also known as

*limites*. Both systems enhanced military movement and sustainment, while providing the necessity of security. Eventually, *limes* became the informal term used to describe the region in which soldiers operated, protecting the lines of communication; hence, frontier.<sup>84</sup>

Over the period 55 B.C. to 300 A.D., the physical characteristic of the frontier in Central Europe changed dramatically. At its inception the *limes* was essentially a "control line and a base for future advances." However, as Roman capability to extend the reaches of their empire waned the *limes* began to assume a more fortified appearance. Yet even under Hadrian, at the height of its most exclusive nature, the *limes* remained "less of demarcation line than a frontier zone."<sup>85</sup> Indeed, the *limes* continued to protect commerce across the broad front of the empire. Thus the frontier is better viewed as "a controlled environment in which contact with the outside world could be facilitated."<sup>86</sup> How Rome secured this environment from external threat and prevented regional instability from influencing its provinces is at the heart of understanding their security policy. Inherent in this analysis, however, is an understanding of the nature of the frontier and the way it was viewed by those who operated within it or were effected by it.

#### The Republican and the Julio-Claudian Systems

In 58 B.C. the Roman Senate acted on a bill submitted by the tribune Publius Vatinius.<sup>87</sup> The *Lex Vatinia de Caesaris Provincia* was, in the Republican tradition, the promulgation of frontier administration where the Senate selected consuls to oversee Rome's provincial territories.<sup>88</sup> The bill, by itself, is of no particular interest except that it reflects the tradition of Republican imperialism and Roman expansion. More importantly, the bill marks the rise of this policy's most skillful practitioner, Julius Caesar, who upon its

passage received a five year governorship to the consular provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and (through an act of fate) Transalpine Gaul.<sup>89</sup>

Shortly after assuming the consulship, Caesar gathered forces in response to an impending intrusion by "barbarians" into Roman territory.<sup>90</sup> His arrival in Gaul marked the beginning of a new chapter in Roman frontier history.<sup>91</sup> Caesar's impressions of the existing security structure as described in his commentaries provide us with a last glimpse of the traditional Republican system.<sup>92</sup> Limited military formations secured the province: one legion and a "few other regular garrison troops." As was the practice by Republican Rome, ultimate security was accomplished through treaties with "client groups" along the periphery of the border. Negotiations required to construct and sustain reliable security across the breadth of the province, consumed the energies of professional diplomats. Military commanders carefully monitored the relative strength of one tribe *vis a vis* another, as well as tribal migrations which may leave a portion of the frontier exposed or present new challenges to the stability of the client tribes. In this respect, reliable clients served as an intelligence source to Romans, providing early warning and assessments of new threat capabilities and limitations.<sup>93</sup>

Additionally, Caesar was aware that security is also linked to a people's ability to sustain a viable economy. He recognized, in this instance, that the impetus for Helvetii migration, hence a security threat, was the failure of their traditional homeland to support its growing population. His response to the challenge is a study in unity of military, diplomatic and economic efforts. After defeating the Helvetii in battle, Caesar forced them to resettle their territory so that no farm land adjoining the provincial border would

be left vacant. To ease their transition, he required another tribe, the Allobroges, to provide grain until the Helvetii had rebuilt their villages and reaped the harvest of their new crops.<sup>94</sup> Thus Caesar demonstrated an understanding of the root cause of regional instability and provided a long term solution in symphony with diplomacy and economy. (see map 1, page 46.)

Caesar, however, could also demonstrate the ruthless application of Roman *limitatio*. In his demand of the German tribal leader Ariovistus that no more Germans were allowed to cross the Rhine,<sup>95</sup> Caesar established the river as a *fines*. Whether as Dyson suggests, this was an exaggerated delineation of ethnicities German and Gaul, or the calculated application of *imperium Romanum*, in practical terms this structuring of Roman territory served the purpose of ensuring a greater degree of provincial security. The now suppressed and client Gaulic tribes policed the region *extra clusa* to protect the provincial *arceo*. Thus, true to the best traditions of Republican Rome, Caesar extended the frontier, established regional security and laid the foundation for what would become the civilizing (Romanization) of Gaul.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, "by the time Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 [BC] Rome had no longer any serious foreign enemies."<sup>97</sup> While Roman internal affairs would delay the prosecution of an expanding frontier policy, upon the assumption of Octavian (Augustus), the Principate once again looked to the horizon and in so doing sought to continue in the footsteps of its Republican predecessors.

Under Augustus, as a sole ruler of Rome, it became possible, for the first time, to develop a long-term foreign policy strategy.<sup>98</sup> With respect to the German frontier, Augustus remained challenged by Germanic incursions along the length of the Gaul's

border. In response, he abandoned his predecessor's defensive policy, in favor of offensive campaigns against hostile tribes east of the Rhine.<sup>99</sup> Between 12 and 9 BC, Augustus' adopted son Drusus conducted a series of campaigns beginning at the newly constructed fortifications along the Rhine River.<sup>100</sup> These began as essentially punitive expeditions to secure the rapidly developing province of Gaul. However, the campaigns also served other purposes: they demonstrated to the frequently rebellious Gauls the continued power of Rome, eliminated through battle the regional Germanic threats and accomplished the practical aim of securing land for future settlement by Italians and retiring legionnaires.<sup>101</sup> (see map 2, page 47.)

The operations of 12 BC stand as an excellent example of a combined campaign with a dual purpose: it reflected a foreign policy change in that the Roman *fines* would now extend along the Elbe not the Rhine and served as revenge for the 5th Legion's defeat by the Sugambrians and Usipeter tribes.<sup>102</sup> Kornemann suggests that this was the first great combined campaign plan since Actium, therefore it was most likely developed by the late Agrippa.<sup>103</sup> In design, it was a double envelopment. To the north, naval forces harbored at Vechten proceeded along the Rhine and then via a canal (specially constructed in support of the operation) to the *Flevo Lacus* and into the North Sea. Their mission was to subdue the coastal tribes of the Friesen and Chauci, moreover establish and maintain a maritime line of communication along the North Sea, retaining access to the river delta.<sup>104</sup> The success of their mission was born out by the defeat and subjugation of those tribes. Indeed, the "big stick" approach, combined with a policy of fair and mild treatment,

proved successful: the Friesen and Chauci became faithful allies, refusing to join a later Germanic rebellion under Arminius in 9 AD.<sup>105</sup>

To the south, at least five legions plus auxiliaries began a simultaneous attack, beginning from bases along the lower Rhine, against the previously victorious tribes of the Usipeter and Sugambrer.<sup>106</sup> This force had less success in that execution of their operation required cutting paths deep into miles of jungle-like forest and constructing a series of fortified camps along the way.<sup>107</sup> More importantly, the Romans were unable to decisively engage the tribes nor were they able to reach the Weser river,<sup>108</sup> necessitating a second punitive expedition the following year. Even though the Sugambrer evaded the Romans in order to fight another Germanic tribe, the expedition ultimately proved successful. Drusus and his army reached the Weser River and in 9 BC finally reached the Elbe, although recalled shortly thereafter by Augustus.<sup>109</sup>

After Drusus' death, his brother Tiberius assumed command and continued campaigning for two more years. Although Tiberius fought no major battles, his persistent demonstration of force convinced the Germanic tribes of the futility of their resistance and secured their submission. In fact, Tiberius' operations were of such a successful nature that all of the hostile tribes formally accepted Roman rule on the same assigned day.<sup>110</sup> Subsequently, following the Roman policy of pacification, Tiberius relocated the hostile tribes' most dangerous factions to the west side of the Rhine where they remained under more direct Roman control. For example, 40,000 of the Sugambrer lost their homes, as well as, large portions of the Suebians, Marser and Chatti.<sup>111</sup>

The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius typify the challenges the Romans faced as they entered an essentially undeveloped region. Difficult terrain combined with miscalculating distances and the resources required to wage a successful campaign in Europe continually required subsequent campaigns of exploration to complete the unfinished work of previous years. Nevertheless, the long-term benefit of the Augustan strategy yielded the establishment of fortifications throughout the region and as a result, greater Roman control. In Rome, the "successes" were greeted with the adulation of the people, prompting Velleius Paterculus to state that Germany was little more than a tribute paying province.<sup>112</sup> These words would come to haunt Augustus, when a "Roman educated," Germanic prince of the Cherusker-Hermann (Arminius) would test Augustus' policy of imperial expansion.

In 7 AD, Augustus appointed P. Quintilius Varus, a former governor of Syria, as the new governor of the province Germania. Failing to understand the nature of his new operational environment, Varus attempted to apply the same Roman system of government in Germania that he formerly used in the Middle East.<sup>113</sup> In particular, his enforcement of the Roman system of taxation and judiciary (i.e. court proceedings held in Latin and public corporal punishment of "free men")<sup>114</sup> caused an uproar among the native population and secured a wide spread following for the rebellious Hermann in 9 AD. In an attempt to crush the revolt, Varus launched a punitive expedition which Hermann surprised and defeated in the Teutoburger Forest. The loss of 3 imperial legions combined with concurrent instability in Panonia and Illyricum forced Augustus to abandon his dream of extending the empire to the Elbe and provided the genesis of a new frontier policy.

### Scientific Frontiers and the Preclusive Defense

The assumption of power by the Flavians marked a significant change in Roman frontier strategy. "The invisible borders of imperial power had given away to physical frontier defenses...intended to serve not as total barriers but rather as the one fixed element in a mobile strategy of imperial defense"<sup>115</sup> In as much as the true value of Republican "marching camps"<sup>116</sup> was psychological, so too, did the "formalization" of the *limes* represent a psychological barrier.<sup>117</sup> Both served as points of departure for the prosecution of the tactical offensive, but the *limes* now manifest this capability from the restrictive character of a defined perimeter.

The creation of a geographic frontier also "involved the development of new societies within the...zone, a process that permanently separated those peoples under Roman control from those outside it"<sup>118</sup> and, as a result, generated a new series of security requirements. With the purpose of providing a stable environment in which the inhabitants of province the Germania would prosper, the frontier now served two purposes. It provided "preclusive security" against low-intensity threats; in response to major regional threats it retained the ability to project significant combat power forward, *before* the enemy actually reached the *limes*.<sup>119</sup> The physical construction of the *limes*, however, only describes part of a very dynamic and fluid security structure involving patrols, customs, tariffs and diplomacy which extended far beyond provincial limits.<sup>120</sup> This allowed "economic development, urbanization and political integration" to occur within the safety of the perimeter,<sup>121</sup> while outside and adjacent to the border, client tribes continued to live as they had under the Republican system.<sup>122</sup> (see map 3, page 48.)

The masters of this "controlled environment" were the imperial provincial governors.<sup>123</sup> Answerable directly to the emperor and the senate, these men were the embodiment of diplomat, judiciary, military commander and bureaucratic administrator. However, despite their broad powers each magistrate received a handbook of standing orders which outlined the limit of his province, his geographic and missionary responsibilities, the agreements concluded between Rome and its allies, and provincial administrative guidance.<sup>124</sup> By way of this vehicle, the emperor and Senate attempted to pursue long-term policy goals. Longer terms of office for governors in the imperial provinces (as long as 24 consecutive years) also facilitated stability.<sup>125</sup> Supporting the governors, were magistrates from a variety of social classes, notably the equestrian class. From Augustus on, the *equites* evolved into the strongest civil service group in the imperial bureaucracy; these men had more thorough military training, and followed a career path which switched between military and civilian assignments.<sup>126</sup> The magistrate's advice was valuable because the inherent uncertainty of the frontier frequently required governors to act with both haste and improvisation.<sup>127</sup>

Despite the restrictions placed upon the governors, the concept of *provincia* allowed for flexible freedom of action. For example, in executing his responsibilities "the province will extend as far as the proconsul is led in the course of carrying out the duties of his office and as far as necessary for their efficient performance."<sup>128</sup> Additionally, the Roman magistrate with *imperium* was foremost a military commander. In the imperial provinces this meant that he raised and maintained legions from his citizenry, and formed auxiliary units from the local population. In case of extreme emergency, additional forces

could reinforce his own units, but ultimately he remained responsible for provincial security. Generally, the magistrate moved about the province during the summer months to monitor the harvest and often set aside the winter for matters of jurisdiction. As the military commander, he frequently led short campaigns against bandits (in some cases, pirates) or demonstrations of power, to ensure the timely and full payment of taxes.<sup>129</sup>

#### The Flavian Period and Domitian's War Against the Chatti (83-84 AD)

Ever since the disaster in the Teutoburger Forest, the 'Germanic Question' remained unresolved. From the Cherusci, who had fought the Roman army continuously for decades,<sup>130</sup> the Chatti inherited the leading role in opposing Roman rule.<sup>131</sup> Alarmed by Roman movements in the tribe's most fertile area of settlement<sup>132</sup> (the Wetterau region: between Frankfurt and Giessen), the Chatti threatened hostilities, prompting Domitian to plan a preemptive strike against them.<sup>133</sup>

Under the guise of reorganizing the Gaulic census, Domitian moved his troops to the Rhine (Mainz) from where he personally led a surprise attack against the Chatti with five legions and numerous auxiliary troops.<sup>134</sup> Awed by the Roman show of force, their superior weapons and tactics, the Chatti declined battle. Instead, from hidden locations within the dense forests of their native lands, the Chatti launched limited attacks against small elements of the Roman army. By assaulting rear areas and supply lines, the Chatti caused considerable damage, often withdrawing with impunity to the safety of the woods.<sup>135</sup>

As a counter measure, Domitian ordered his troops to cut paths (*limes*) into the forest, altogether a distance of 120 miles (180 km).<sup>136</sup> From these paths his soldiers

attacked the rebel strongholds, while patrols secured the '*limes*,' thus bringing to an end the German resistance.<sup>137</sup> Although deprived of a decisive and glorious battle, Domitian considered himself the victor, assumed the honorary name "Germanicus" and left the tedious work of securing the military infrastructure (building roads, fortified camps and fighting skirmishes) to his legate.<sup>138</sup> Ultimately, the Chatti signed a treaty with Rome, receiving apparently mild conditions and the status of *foederati*.<sup>139</sup>

After the war, the Romans began to establish a military frontier, the beginnings of the Upper Germanic Limes. The *limes* ran along an area from which a possible future attack by the Neuwieder Becken might be expected: the Taunus mountains and the Wetterau.<sup>140</sup> Initially the '*limes*' consisted of no more than a path, which the soldiers used for patrolling, and wooden guard towers, inhabited by 4-5 men. From 90 AD on, the Romans began erecting small wooden forts in regular intervals along the border to house the irregular auxiliary units, called *numeri*, (about 100-150 men per fort) whose duty consisted mainly of guarding the frontier.<sup>141</sup> Baatz states that when Tacitus refers to these forts and the *limes* a few years later, he uses the term *limes* the sense of a 'military frontier' for the first time in antiquity.<sup>142</sup>

#### Creation and Pacification of a New Province

Between 85 and 90 AD the Romans established two new provinces: *Germania Inferior* (Lower Germany) with Cologne as its administrative and military center and *Germania Superior* (Upper Germany) with Mainz as its capital. From this point, the Romans systematically developed this conquered territory according to their notions of order. Their mission was especially pressing because in *Germania Superior* the Romans

faced a heterogeneous ethnic mix: various Germanic tribes, remnants of the original Celtic population and, settling in the *agri decumates* (between Rhine and Danube), "all the most disreputable characters of Gaul," as Tacitus recounts.<sup>143</sup>

In establishing civilization, the Romans introduced the concepts of urban life, infrastructure, 'modern' technology,<sup>144</sup> their legal and taxation systems.<sup>145</sup> One of their most important provincial taxes, the land tax, required the assessment of property lines by surveying in a manner which disregarded both topography and existing private property.<sup>146</sup> That the indigenous population considered these administrative measures a hardship is inferred from archeological findings. Almost everywhere traditional settlements were abandoned, then the area was resettled in Roman-style *vici* (villages) and *villae rusticae* (farm houses).<sup>147</sup>

The advantages of the new life-style must have outweighed the disadvantages. The Romans introduced the natives to better breeds of domestic animals, higher grades of seeds, new types of fruit, more efficient methods of farming and a whole new industry - timber.<sup>148</sup> They experienced unprecedeted levels of trade in volumes formerly unknown to them, via rivers as well as on the wide net of Roman constructed roads;<sup>149</sup> the army turned out to be the major buyer of agricultural products. Villages sprung up all along the border, inhabited by tradesmen, craftsmen and people offering a wide variety of services to both the military and the civilian rural population.<sup>150</sup>

It was in the new cities and towns, though, where "Romanization" took hold at the fastest pace: here the Romans taught the indigenous population the value of elections, an administration, a well functioning bureaucracy and a differentiated court system.<sup>151</sup>

Eventually, only the highest ranking magistrates in a province were Romans, whereas natives, who had learned the rules of self-government, served in public offices such as city councilmen, mayors, policemen and tax collectors.<sup>152</sup>

All in all, the provinces including the immediate border regions experienced a marked rise in prosperity.<sup>153</sup> This in turn continually attracted thieving bands of Germans from across the border; stopping their raids was one of the border troops' most important tasks.<sup>154</sup> Initially Roman soldiers were probably regarded with the common disdain felt towards an army of occupation, which not only protected the borders against outside enemies but also enforced Roman legislation and intimidated the natives. However, the Romans soon began to recruit auxiliary units from the indigenous population, whereas regular legions only accepted recruits in possession of the Roman citizenship.<sup>155</sup> In due time, the Romans formed entire units of people who permanently lived in or near the frontier area and who owned property there. This personal stake in security served as an additional incentive for frontier protection and ensured unit reliability.<sup>156</sup>

### Operations on the Limes

At the height of its efficiency, we can describe security operations along the *limes* in terms of the three military organizations created to serve along the frontier. The first were the *numeri* (imported military units allied with Rome) who manned observation towers, guarded the border paths (*limes*) and crossing sites. Together with representatives of the provincial bureaucracy, the *numeri* monitored cross border travel and served as the first security element to "customs" officials responsible for excising tariffs. As "imported" units, the *numeri* were thought by the Romans to be impartial to

local tribal influence. While representing little threat in terms of inherent combat power, the *numeri* operated under the instructions of the provincial *dux* (commander) which in turn ensured their security by stronger combat units.

The Romans created *auxiliari* units from local recruitment. Organized in a manner similar to the imperial legion but not as adequately equipped, the *auxiliari* served as a reaction force, responding to impending or on going border incursions. The auxiliary occupied compounds near the border and upon alert<sup>157</sup> from the *numeri*, *amici* or spies marched forward of the *limes* in a preventative manner to engage hostile forces before reaching the *limes*. Simultaneously other *auxiliari* units would move to the reinforce the *numeri* along the threatened portion of the border. The *auxiliari* were reliable in that they received Roman tactical training; indeed Roman officers and centurions commanded many of the *auxiliari* units.

The third element of the security structure was the Legion, which performed the function of major combat. Although housed in compounds internal to the province, the legions also conducted operations beyond the border. Unlike the *auxiliari*, the legion represented the "fury of Rome." Commanders designed their campaigns into barbarian territory to impress, intimidate and coerce recalcitrant *amici* or new belligerent tribes to submit to *imperium Romanum*. When a restrained show of force failed to elicit a favorable response, the legion(s) under the command of the magistrate resorted to punitive measures to secure a decision by combat.

By and large, Roman successes far outnumbered their defeats. Even following a loss, subsequent campaigns served to avenge the loss of legionary standards and prosecute

the goal of the original effort, normally the submission of a hostile tribe.<sup>158</sup> As a "shock force," however, the imperial legion retained a lethality unmatched by barbarian forces far in to the third century. This asymmetry was due to organizational, psychological and technological superiority which rendered the more open "barbarian" tactics and equipment ineffective. Small, lethal and expensive, the legion was a tool designed for a special purpose: engaging and destroying large enemy formations in direct combat. When used otherwise, the legionary system's flaws and limitations became apparent. However, as the third leg in a preclusive defense triad, the legion frequently was the final and most effective long-term solution to regional security threats.

#### Defense in Depth: Diocletian and the Crisis of the 3rd Century

By the third century, Roman presence in central Europe indelibly impacted upon the lives of European tribes as far away as the Baltic. Not only did many tribes adopt elements of Roman culture, but some (notably the Hermunduri) through long running treaties achieved a degree of parity in terms of social status and economic prosperity. Indeed the provinces and *foederati* were fixtures of the Roman economy, in that the frontier served as a spring board for the procurement of goods outside the empire.<sup>159</sup> As "Romanization" of Europe lessened the socio-technological gap between Roman and barbarian, the same also holds true in warfare.<sup>160</sup> Subsequently, tribal tactics, organization and equipment reflected of a synthesis of Roman and German cultures.

As Germanic tribes grew stronger and, through confederation grew larger, the security strategy of the previous centuries became less effective.<sup>161</sup> The *limes*, designed to deter small raiding parties was no match for organized assaults by large marauding tribal

war parties. Likewise, the *auxiliari* assigned to defend forward along the perimeter lost their early warning due to a new tribal unity which negated the successful use of *amici*, secure patrolling and spies.<sup>162</sup> Even when dispatched forward the *auxiliari* simply were no match for the numbers and quality of the new barbarian threat. The result was disastrous to the security of Roman interests west of the *limes*. The "preclusive" security structure was no longer viable, conceptually, physically, and spatially. Once this became apparent to the bellicose tribes from the east, the lure of provincial wealth was just too great to ignore.<sup>163</sup> Tribes formerly content as *amici* allied with more violent plunderers. Soon the once stable frontier became a battle zone. At stake was no less than provincial survival.

Luttwak suggests that as a result of the changing nature of the threat, the Romans turned to a "defense in depth" strategy.<sup>164</sup> The significance of this "change" is that it was only a measure designed to return to the status-quo: the preclusive defense.<sup>165</sup> Although Whittaker challenges the notion of any change in strategy beyond "the conquest of the enemy and control beyond the *limites*,"<sup>166</sup> Luttwak's premise appears sound from a military perspective. (Interestingly, both authors point to archeological evidence which support Luttwak's position.<sup>167</sup>) Under the "defense in depth" concept, the *limes* remained manned but probably at a lower level.<sup>168</sup> Aggressors who crossed the *limes* confronted fortified strongholds (walled cities, farmhouses, granaries etc.<sup>169</sup>) Having no siege capability, the barbarians would prove unable to sack the fortifications.<sup>170</sup> Meanwhile mobile forces of varying sizes could maneuver against the barbarians in concert with the effect created by the fortified structures.<sup>171</sup> (see map 4, page 49.)

From the physical perspective, a key element of the defense in depth is the construction of a series of fortified positions.<sup>172</sup> In this regard Luttwak outlines five of their functions:<sup>173</sup> (1) they could serve as supply depots, (2) they could serve as obstacles, especially when cited to deny access to river crossing sites or mountain passes,<sup>174</sup> (3) they provided a degree of "rear area security" and "intelligence" of advancing barbarians, once the fortification is bypassed (When constructed along road ways, these forts will also impede barbarian movement.<sup>175</sup>), (4) they can house mobile garrisons, which can attack the enemy flank and rear, then return to safety, (5) they will assist the force in conserving its strength by providing refuge, supplies and safe place to rest.<sup>176</sup> This last item is particularly important to defeated or attritted units.

Coincident with *limes* construction to support the new strategy was also the recognition that the *limes'* previous "trace" (designed as a start point for offensive operations) was no longer appropriate for a defense in depth. As a result, the Romans abandoned many of the older fortifications east of the Rhine in favor of the more geographically defined river boundary: the Rhine-Iller-Danube line.<sup>177</sup> However, "no emperor could afford to admit that Roman territory was lost, since that would contradict the ideology of the sacred *termini*."<sup>178</sup> Therefore, the "defense in depth" strategy was a temporary measure, exercised until Rome could once again extend physical control of *imperium* to the Elbe.

The "defense in depth" reached its height under Diocletian, again using a triad of military forces, however their composition and use are markedly different from previous centuries. The *alae* and *cohorts* became immobile and manned the static fortifications,

while the *equites* (cavalry) responded to the barbarian incursion in the manner of a rapid reaction force. The legion continued to serve as the main defensive and fighting force and would concentrate on the enemy.<sup>179</sup> Over time this arrangement gave way to increasingly mobile forces no longer tied to fixed locations or even provinces<sup>180</sup> while *limitanei* and provincial forces continued to serve along the border.<sup>181</sup>

In the end, frontier security became the responsibility of barbarian alliances. Roman citizens came to view military service with disdain and as recruitment for military service became increasingly ineffective, Rome turned to the expedient of mercenary service. Overtime the "barbarianization" of the army also yielded a decline in both effectiveness and loyalty. More importantly, the asymmetry once enjoyed by the legion against their opponents gave way in many respects to tactical inferiority. The discipline which made the legion so effective devolved amateurism and defeat. Certainly some Roman military units continued to operate with great effect, and periodic reform slowed overall decline but ultimately the army reached a point at which it no longer carried the moral dominance of previous centuries. With this loss of confidence and prestige, new hostile forces eagerly stepped forward to fill the power vacuum.

Ultimately, the empire no longer had the capacity to ensure the security of its people and the provinces assumed the look of a pre-medieval security structure.<sup>182</sup> Cities and wealthy land owners formed their own defense forces. Some of the new "warlords" faced destruction by marauding tribes while others simply switched their allegiance from Rome to the new dominant regional power. Europe north of the Alps was lost and while Rome continued to fight for survival, its fate was sealed.

*Let us go even back of ancient battle, to primeval struggle. In progressing from savage to our times we shall get a better grasp of life.<sup>183</sup>*

*Ardant du Picq*

#### IV. Comparison and Conclusions

The ability to compel another to do one's will is often associated with war,<sup>184</sup> while in modern Peace Enforcement jargon, we seek "to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions."<sup>185</sup> Yet the Roman experience demonstrates that the desire to achieve regional stability in accordance with "just law" is an ancient concern fraught with many of the same challenges faced by modern "peace keepers." Given the relative infancy of America's peace enforcement doctrine and the contemporary nature of the analysis, is our doctrine sound or in our attempt to develop a doctrine for something "not yet born" have we once again overlooked the lessons of history?

The analysis of the Roman frontier experience and its implications to peace enforcement operations yielded three results. First, the research yields that we cannot determine but only infer the *process* of Roman campaign design or the prosecution of a *known* strategy given the paucity of historiographic and archeological evidence. Second, we would fall prey to the improper use of history if we drew *direct* comparisons of the Roman frontier experience to our own modern tactics, techniques and procedures. We are not Romans and nothing like the United nations existed during their epoch. The differences in environments are simply too great for us to draw legitimate parallels. Third, in the area of doctrine, the analysis does however suggest that several concepts and principles persist throughout time despite apparent differences in technology and cultures. These ideas may prove useful when considering our current peace enforcement doctrine.

### The Rule of Law

The Roman consideration for the rule of law was of singular importance in justifying the engagement of a belligerent.<sup>186</sup> Whether the empire's expansion was in fact imperialistic or in self-defense remains ongoing debate, however, today we can only speculate on the true nature of Roman policy; the evidence remains inconclusive. Of greater importance is the legitimizing effect which law brings to a campaign and the psychological reassurance it provides to the soldiers. To the Romans, law insured that the war was just and the gods voiced their approval through military success. Today we first answer a series of questions, designed to weed out poorly conceived missions from those that are both deserving and which have a chance to succeed. As a result, our soldiers believe the mission is just and as leaders, we know that it is also in our national interest.

The tension created by the U.N. Secretary General is significant in that it represents a shift away from the concept of national sovereignty toward "universal sovereignty." The problem, however, with universal sovereignty is that it simply is *not* universal. The world remains culturally differentiated. Citing religion alone, Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism each view the world from a different perspective. Moreover, with the advent of religious fundamentalism, these attitudes not only clash where they come into contact but may also represent a threat to national sovereignty. Therefore how do we reconcile our values against those of another culture in a manner that is acceptable to both? More importantly, if we are to enforce universal sovereignty how can we ensure that it is a palatable concept to the nation in which we must operate?

Similarly, we must recognize that the European concept of the 'nation state' in many parts of the world is an artificial distinction devoid of historical and cultural sensitivities. For example, geographic boundaries will always seem meaningless to nomadic tribes. What is more, even in the case of Europe, many ethnic areas extend beyond "national boundaries." Here we see that cultural loyalty supersedes any concept of nation. Our recent experience in Somalia reacquainted us with collective tribal recognition of what we inappropriately labeled "warlords," but who in reality are leaders or chiefs. So it is that neither paradigm is totally appropriate to administer the world as we find it. How then can peace enforcement operations succeed in a region which neither accepts the geographic distinctions attributed to it by the West, nor recognizes the idealistic concept of universal sovereignty? Again we may turn to the Romans for at least a partial answer.

Despite their confidence in geography, the Romans clearly journeyed into the unknown as they entered Central Europe. Nevertheless, many of their initial contacts with indigenous peoples were friendly. Although Roman conquests and the pursuit of *laus* and *gloria*<sup>187</sup> are more heavily documented by the weight of surviving literature, an irrefutable aspect of Roman expansion and subsequent security operations was their recognition of each tribe's unique identity and sense of justice.<sup>188</sup> This recognition manifested itself in the administration of law. In controlled territories (provinces), the Romans acknowledged the legitimacy of existing indigenous law, while at the same time superimposed an overarching concept of Roman law above the *amici*. This served two purposes: it protected Roman citizens from barbarian law, and led to the gradual education of the barbarians towards a codified legal system. Outside the provinces, the Romans retained the "legitimate"

authority of *imperium* which permitted the exercise of power as deemed appropriate by the imperial legate, but within the context of existing treaties.

In effect, the Romans developed a flexible legal apparatus for the prosecution of military policy both within their defined geographic "area of operations" and also in their "area of interest." Associated with this freedom of action was also the realization that the Romans were the most lethal military force in the region. Yet, punitive campaigns in belligerent territory were not without risk. The implication for modern peace enforcement operations is that the application of force must be in accordance with law. Over time, the consistent application of force in conjunction with appropriate diplomatic activities will yield positive results; however, the military must succeed and diplomats must not prosecute a policy beyond which the army is capable of enforcing.

### Legitimacy

The "rule of law" in many ways legitimizes the actions of a nation, at least as long as no other nation or opposing groups are able, either physically or via participation in a security structure, to challenge the law. Yet despite legal authorization, a belligerent group may not recognize the actions of the sanctioned nation as legitimate. Caesar's confrontation with the Germanic "king" Ariovistus is a poignant example of *perceived* legitimacy. From Ariovistus' perspective the arrival of Romans into Central Europe was an intrusion, moreover Caesar's demand for Germanic submission was an affront. Conversely some scholars argue that the need to acquire *amici* and thus a buffer region to protect Roman and *foedorati* interests warranted the "offensive-defense" posture toward the Germans, thus justifying Caesar under Roman law. (see map 1, page 46)

In this regard, Rome clearly sought to compel German compliance with generally accepted resolutions and sanctions, even if it required trial by combat to accomplish the task. After defeat, the reluctant Germans either agreed to Roman conditions (including relocation) or fled to the relative security of the east. This policy continued with general success as long as Roman legions retained tactical, technical and material superiority over the barbarians. Indeed some tribes accepted Roman terms without a fight while even defeated tribes grew to become staunch allies of Rome. However, Rome's long-term success only began with military victory and moderate treatment of the vanquished. Afterwards, Rome demonstrated its legitimate right to rule by improving the quality of life for those living in or adjacent to the provinces. Through the provincial governor and his bureaucracy Rome was able to mesh the simultaneous activities of security, diplomacy, economic and social development. It is for this reason that former barbarian regions became "Romanized" but more to the point one could also state that the provincial regions and the frontier were stabilized.

The Roman experience demonstrates the soundness of our Peace Enforcement doctrine, namely that peace enforcement missions are undertaken to "maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."<sup>189</sup> However, we should not suffer false illusions, the power to affect political dialogue is obtained by the barrel of a gun (or the tip of a gladius). Belligerents may never wholly accept the notion of foreign troops controlling portions or all of a sovereign nation, but given an appropriately designed force, they will recognize lethality and submit to the force's "moral dominance." Our ability to coerce and compel, is the key to our freedom of

action. Peace enforcement units must *earn* and maintain legitimacy. The degree and speed with which the unit acquires it depends as much upon the multifaceted perceptions, culture and interests of the belligerent, as it does on the charter which sanctions the mission. Peace enforcement can achieve belligerent compliance without legitimacy, but once a belligerent comes to accept the force's presence the more easily the peace enforcement unit can set the conditions for diplomatic dialogue.

### Impartiality

FM 100-23 states that peace operations occur within a dynamic environment which is shaped by several factors, among them - impartiality. "A peace operation is...influenced by the degree to which the force acts in an impartial manner and the degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial... PE also involves impartiality, which may change over time and with the nature of operations."<sup>190</sup> However, contrary to the doctrine, the very nature of peace enforcement precludes "an even handed approach" toward all sides of a conflict. That the situation has deteriorated to the point where armed intervention is necessary suggests an unwillingness on the part of at least one belligerent to settle the dispute peacefully. Moreover, the moment a force undertakes a peace enforcement mission to "compel compliance of resolutions," the belligerent will no longer view the peace enforcer as impartial. Similarly, in an environment where one belligerent party is clearly responsible for naked aggression against another, an "even handed" approach may not be necessary.

The belief that "impartiality" is a critical variable to peace operations is misguided. Impartiality must remain central to peacekeeping, but to apply the same conditions to

peace enforcement suggests that the operations are by nature the same. While doctrine acknowledges that peace enforcement will likely occur in an environment of "low impartiality," we may learn from the Romans that impartiality is also irrelevant. In deciding to use force, we accept the risk that the nature of the conflict may change. As a result, we must plan for overwhelming force at the most opportune time and place in order to both maximize our chance of success and retain sufficient combat power, should the mission go astray.

Secondly, under the law, impartiality is clearly secondary to consistency. The Romans backed their words with deeds in a manner which all belligerents understood. This was of paramount importance when they engaged a formerly unknown hostile tribe for the first time. As peace keepers/enforcers, we should take this lesson to heart. Any belligerent must understand that our actions are sanctioned by law and that we will enforce the terms of the charter regardless of who violates the agreement. Accordingly we must never fall prey to using idle threats or fail to enforce any declaration in a manner other than as we have stated. If impartiality is achieved by peace enforcement at all, it is the result of the consistent and deliberate use of force by law.

#### Campaign Design and the Use of Force

While little is actually known about the physical process used by the Romans in designing their campaigns, we are able to deduce several conclusions and facts from literature, historiography and archaeology. On the whole, Luttwak and several German scholars have the most to say in terms of Roman "strategy" and it is from their research that we learn of the both campaign complexity as well as their intended purpose. As an

example the campaign of 12 BC by Drusus Germanicus reflected a plan of enormous scope, defined political and military objectives, integrated combined operations, and substantial logistical support. Although ending in a tactical stalemate, the campaign was successful from Augustus' perspective: once again Rome demonstrated its ability to strike into the heart of a belligerent's homeland.<sup>191</sup> As a warning and as a deterrent, the campaign succeeded in preventing "Germanic" aggression for the next ten years. Subsequent campaigns even achieved regional stability for decades. Over time, Roman influence and diplomacy continued to shape the Germans in ways which the force of arms failed to do. In effect the military campaign created the conditions under which diplomacy was able to prosper and as a result Rome maintained regional stability.

A second associated aspect to the campaign was the Roman use of population control. While Republican Rome sought to develop a security structure through the cultivation of frontier client states, later generations continued the policy to including the relocation and supervision of particularly hostile belligerents. This policy is significant from a variety of perspectives. It eliminated a belligerent's freedom of action on the periphery of the frontier, where another tribe more agreeable to Rome could replace it. Also, relocation allowed Rome to monitor more closely and hold in check potential unrest within the tribe. Finally, the policy created the conditions which permitted the tribe's "Romanization" and eventual assimilation into the empire.

Further, the Romans achieved a unity of effort which perhaps remained unmatched until the conquests of Napoleon. Manifest in the position of governor and supported by a bureaucracy, Rome synthesized the political, diplomatic, legal, economic and military

activities of a province in ways that ensured a unity of purpose. That the system could also fail due to the ineptitude or corruptness of the governor is also true, but as a structure the system facilitated cooperation. The implications for modern peace enforcement are that they require a unity of effort extending through all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. It is interesting to note that at first the Romans were not successful in that their bureaucracy was corrupt, lethargic and unresponsive; hence their reforms which required all civil servants to have served honorably in the military for a minimum of 16 years. We may ask of ourselves, what measures must we take in order to overcome interdepartmental friction? More importantly, given the disparity between military and foreign service cultures, much less international distinctions, how can we act in ways that dissipate our institutional biases?

Lastly, our peace doctrine warns us that the use of force can "escalate the level of violence," changing the nature of the operational environment. As we have learned from the Romans, given the proper resources, we can effectively respond to these changes but as in planning for war, we must consider the "worst case scenario." In the end, peace enforcement missions, regardless of the context in which they occur, are combat operations. While Rome certainly pursued regional stability toward arguably different ends, their experiences reinforce the idea that coercion and compliance are ultimately effects of the human dimension. The ability to shape perceptions, achieve legitimacy and garner compliance are all outcomes of human interaction. In this regard, the Roman application of force consistent with policy remains a poignant legacy.

## Conclusion


FM 100-23, Peace Operations, contributes greatly to eliminating the "ad hocrary" of "peacekeeping" doctrine, but are the principles ascribed to peace enforcement not "de facto"? Given the relative longevity of UN peacekeeping missions, our global experiences yield reasonable conclusions concerning principles of employment and operations. Peace enforcement, however, is by its very nature not peacekeeping. Therefore, to suggest that the same over-arching principles apply to both is not only ill conceived, it obfuscates the real nature of peace enforcement which is anything but peaceful.

Writers of future "peace doctrine" should avoid lumping peace enforcement and peacekeeping under the same rubric. Rather, they should recognize the distinctly different nature of the two operations and their unique conceptual composition. They should also understand that the two missions are sometimes compatible and can occur concurrently within the same theater of operations or campaign plan. What we learned from the Romans is that peace enforcement operations - the restoration of stability, security operations, denial of movement, supervision of protected zones and separation of belligerents - are not *new* missions. They are missions planned and executed as for combat, with all the inherent considerations for risk taking and contingency planning, integrated with other accompanying non-military operations. To the degree that current and future peace enforcement planners recognize these operations for what they truly are and what they are capable of accomplishing, our effectiveness will improve. As an army we must recognize that military force, when applied properly, is an appropriate means toward the accomplishment of some, but not all, political endstates.


Map 1 - Caesar's Security Structure for Gaul



Map 2 - Drusus' Campaigns of 12-9 B.C.




Map 3 - The Preclusive Defense



- Legion
- Cavalry
- Cohort (Auxiliari)
- Watch Tower

#### **Map 4 - The Defense in Depth**



L Fortified Legionary Post

A Auxiliary Ford



Fortified Farm House

## ⑥ Fortified Granary

## Appendix A. The Roman Delineation of Space



Centuration, as described by Hyginus Gromaticus, showing an area *arceo*, *extra clusa* and *fines*.<sup>192</sup>

## **Appendix B. Extract of the UN Charter**

### **Chapter VI**

#### **Pacific Settlement of Disputes**

##### **Article 33**

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.

### **Chapter VII**

#### **Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the peace, and Acts of Aggression**

##### **Article 39**

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

##### **Article 41**

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

##### **Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

## Appendix C. Glossary of Latin Terms

amici	- friend
agri decumates	- the area generally between the Rhine and Danube rivers
arceo	- organized land
arcifinius	- boundary beyond, protects the organized land
auxileri	- allied combat formations
clementia	- clemency
dux	- commander
fides	- submission as an act of good faith, to become a protectorate
fines	- defined limit of territory
foedus	- treaty
imperium	- compelling others to obey orders
justum bellum	- legal or justified war
legati	- commission of ambassadors
limes	- path or road, route of penetration into enemy territory, frontier
limitatio	- surveying
numeri	- imported units
pax	- peace as a condition achieved through war
pium	- in accord with the sanction of religion and commands of the gods
provincia	- province
termini	- boundary stones

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> "Donald M. Snow is Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama. He previously served as Visiting Professor of Political Science in the Army War College's Department of National Security and Strategy, as Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow, and as Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs at the Air Command and Staff College. Dr. Snow is the author of twelve books and over 30 articles and book chapters." Biographical sketch taken from Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenburg, The American Political Dictionary, Ninth Edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, 1993, p. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/3, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Sarah Sewall, "Peace Enforcement and the United Nations," Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, Ed. Dennis J. Quinn, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 111. Ms. Sarah Sewall is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Policy. She holds an A.B. from Harvard University and a M.Phil. from Oxford University, where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

<sup>8</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> "John F. Hillen III is a doctoral candidate and overseas research scholar at Oxford. He served as a Regular Army armor officer with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from 1989 to 1992. During Operation Desert Storm he was the 2nd Squadron's plans officer and operated the squadron's forward command post from a Bradley fighting vehicle during the battle of the 73 Easting. He holds a bachelor's degree in public policy studies and history from Duke University and an M.A. in war studies from King's College London. He is an Army Reserve officer and serves periodically as a battlestaff officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, Europe." Biography taken from Parameters, Spring, 1994, p. 28.

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<sup>11</sup> John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," Parameters, Spring, 1994, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Article 42, Chapter VII, UN Charter, see Appendix B.

<sup>13</sup> Hillen, p. 28. "Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, recognizing the improvised nature of any type of UN collective security attempted during the Cold War, labeled UN peacekeeping operations as "Chapter Six and a Half" to characterize their tenuous legitimacy under the Charter. Council recommendations under Chapter Six during the Cold War were not enforceable, while full scale military intervention under Chapter Seven could never be agreed upon by the superpowers. Cold War peacekeeping operations were sufficiently unambiguous to merit approval by the superpowers and their clients. The UN characterized peacekeeping as a "holding action born of necessity and largely improvised." peacekeeping operations conducted before 1989 reflect the full effects of Cold War stasis."

Compare: Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1971, p. 225-232. Fabian provides a ten point plan for developing a strategy of preparedness. Central to the success of any plan however is the willingness of the US and USSR to engage in fruitful dialogue.

<sup>14</sup> Hillen, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> Boutros-Ghali, p. 99.

<sup>16</sup> Russell Watson, et. al., "It's Our Fight Now," Newsweek, December 14, 1992, p. 31. Snow cites Watson's article which describes the Boutros-Ghali view of universal sovereignty "as the underlining concept for U.N. sanctions of efforts in Somalia, as stated in Security Council Resolution 794."

<sup>17</sup> Snow, p. 28-29. "The matter of principle is the U.N. Charter's adherence to the "sovereign equality" of its members found in Article 2, Section 1. To authorize the use of a peace-enforcement mission, for instance, Bosnia, would force the U.N. to amend its charter. To suggest that it do so would compromise and abuse the organization."

<sup>18</sup> "sovereignty," The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1976, p. 1236.

<sup>19</sup> Snow, p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, Washington: Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 1984, p. 88-89. "As for recruitment, variouus factors play a role. In a U.N. operation, a shifting out must be made of the firm offers to obtain geographical and political balance. Aiding

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U.N. recruitment is the fact that the United Nations can usually count on troop contingent offers from several dozen middle-sized states whose military forces have developed a tradition and expertise in multinational peacekeeping.

The first imperative should be to get professionally competent, highly effective national contingents for the force, both line infantry and support elements. Only after the performance and capability needs are covered should the question of balance -- geographical and political -- of the force be considered. In some cases it may not always be possible to achieve a fairly balanced force."

<sup>21</sup> James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," Parameters, Spring, 1994, p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> Houghton and Trinka, p. 80. "*Expense*. The MFO [Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai] cost over \$200 million to establish, and the United States paid 60 percent of that amount. It is doubtful if a non-U.N. multination peacekeeping operation of any size could be created without the financial backing of a superpower. The financial burden of such an operation consequently falls on only a few states."

<sup>24</sup> ---The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, United Nations, 1990, p. 7. "Finally, it is essential that the operation have a sound financial basis. The financing of peace-keeping has been one of its most controversial and least satisfactory aspects. Almost all operations are now financed by obligatory contributions levied on Member States. If the Member States do not pay their contributions promptly and in full, the Secretary-General lacks the financial resources needed to reimburse to the troop-contributing Governments the sums due to them. This means, in effect, that those Governments have to pay an unfairly high share of the cost of the operation in question, in addition to sending their soldiers to serve in unpredictable and sometimes dangerous situations."

<sup>25</sup> Sewall, p. 105.

<sup>26</sup> "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Presidential Decision Directive 25, May 1994.

### Executive Summary - Six major issues of reform and improvement:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support-- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.

2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations , both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.

3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.

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4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.
5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive and Congress and the American public on peace operations.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Sewall, p. 103.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>30</sup> FM 100-23, p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Sewall, p. 105.

Compare: Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 98. Another perspective is that peacekeeping fails to *resolve* conflict.

<sup>34</sup> PDD 25, p. 3-5.

<sup>35</sup> FM 100-23, p. 12. Generally, a contingent that has been conducting operations under a PE mandate should not be used in a PK role in that same mission area because the impartiality and consent divides have been crossed during the enforcement operation. Commanders must understand these key differences. The crucial discriminators between PK and PE consists of the operational variables: consent, force and impartiality.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12-14.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>40</sup> Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, New York: The Free press, 1988, p. 122-124. "Wars usually end when the fighting nations *agree* on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations *disagree* on their relative strength."

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<sup>41</sup> FM 100-23, p. 13. Taken from Figure 1-4. Operational Variables.

<sup>42</sup> Sewall, p. 104. "Member states must work to resist a temptation to make options more palatable by pinching pennies or downsizing a proposed force--without changing the original objective. Simply calling a peace enforcement operation a peacekeeping mission and reducing force requirements by a factor of four is not a means of sustaining support for peace operations. It will only ensure failure, and it will be the surest way of discrediting peace operations in the long run."

Compare: Houghton and Trinka, p. 88. "There is a natural desire to try to anticipate all possible contingencies and therefore to establish a force of generous size. Working to counter this tendency is the push for reduced numbers prompted by difficulties in recruiting the force and in covering its costs. The actual size of the force therefore seems to gravitate toward some intermediate point between these two tendencies. On balance, a lean operation is to be preferred. The same caveat would apply to the headquarters staffing -- better a smaller staff fully employed than too many people with not enough to do."

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>44</sup> FM 100-23, p. 13.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 15-18.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>49</sup> Sewall., p. 105.

<sup>50</sup> FM 100-23, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>52</sup> Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 98, and 105-106. "Four explanations for the persistent failure of peacekeeping operations were explored. First, peacekeeping operations could not achieve conflict resolution if they were unable to stop the violence; some missions were preoccupied with short-term problems with keeping the peace and therefore did not devote much attention to long-term resolution efforts. Even those operations that did limit violence had difficulties in peacemaking. A second explanation centered on the extent of the connection between the peacekeeping efforts and the diplomatic efforts to resolve

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the dispute. Failure occurred in a variety of scenarios; it seemed not to matter whether the peacekeeping operation had extensive diplomatic initiatives or no mechanisms at all for finding a peaceful settlement to the dispute. A third possibility was that peacekeeping actually inhibits negotiations by removing some of the urgency from the situation. This was found to have some validity, although one could not offer it as a general explanation for why peacekeeping operations fail. The final explanation, the inappropriateness of peacekeeping operations for conflict resolution, although not negating the utility that parts of other explanations may have, is one that is able to account for all operations' experiences. Regardless of the circumstances of the peacekeeping operation-type of conflict, actors involved, and other elements of context-the end result was failure. It may be true that no diplomatic efforts can resolve two or more fundamentally incompatible positions, yet it appears that peacekeeping is not the mechanism to achieve satisfactory diplomatic outcomes."

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>55</sup> Rudyard Kipling, Puck of Pook's Hill as cited by C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Whittaker, p. 68. "It is true that two places are marked as *fines Romanorum* on a section of the Peutinger Table depicting Syria and Mesopotamia, a medieval copy of a fourth-century A.D. Roman road map. But apart from dating difficulties, these *fines* look as if they were the boundary between the provinces of a client state (possibly Palmyra), since underneath one is written *fines exercitus Syriatiae*, showing where the military responsibility of the Roman army ended."

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 10-30. Whittaker's first chapter, "Space, Power and Society" surveys both the ancient and contemporary perspectives of "frontier" to include the misinterpretation of the Roman frontier by a variety of once respected historians.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 12. "'chorography' (the Greek word Strabo used for his detailed study of lands, unlike the global study of geography")

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 12-13.

Compare: Dietwulf Baatz, Der römische Limes: Archaeologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau, Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1993. p. 10-11. The Mediterranean people did not have an accurate understanding of the distances involved in an Eurasian campaign. For example, on Agrippa's world map, the north-south expansion of the continent was estimated to be 400 miles (600 km) where as it is about ten times as large. In addition, they believed that this area was scarcely populated, if at all.

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<sup>60</sup> Paul Claval, Espace et pouvoir, Paris, 1978, p.109, as cited by Whittaker, p. 16.

<sup>61</sup> Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration, London: Routledge, 1993, p.22. "The emperor Augustus later stated in his official autobiography that his army had forced even the Dacians beyond the Danube to *perferre Romana imperia*, submit to Roman instructions."

<sup>62</sup> Baatz, p. 10.

<sup>63</sup> Virgil, Aeneid, Trans. John Dryden, New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1937, p. 82, l. 36-37.

"To them [Romans] no bounds of empire I assign,  
Nor term of years to their immortal line."

<sup>64</sup> Whittaker, p. 16.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 19. "All rectangular surveys in history have had a strongly utopian character, used in a period of expanding power and colonial foundations as the dream of a distant administration for organized control. The great American Rectangular Land Survey of the eighteenth century was designed to bring "order upon the land" at a time of particularly fluid frontiers. Frederick Jackson Turner, whose 1893 paper on the American frontier laid the basis for future frontier studies, regarded the Ordinance of 1785, which established the American survey, as fundamental to the welfare of the early settlers... Yet at the same time... Turner viewed this as not inconsistent with the theory of an open American frontier-not as a line to stop at but an area inviting entrance."

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 19-20. "The 'magic circle' of the sacred *pomerium* was redrawn in every colonial foundation by the *circumdatio* or drawing of the lines around a city and the cutting of the first sod-the *sulcus primigenius*-when the plow was pulled by a bull and a cow... The male...was always yoked on the outside of the *sulcus* 'toward the countryside' and the female inside 'on the city side,' 'so that the men may be feared by outsiders and the women may be fertile within... The *termini* of the *pomerium*, therefore, were in a sense the limits of the organized power of the city, beyond which the fighting men were stationed."

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 24-25. "*Termini* and *fines*, therefore, referred to the limits of internal order, not of military power. *Propagatio terminorum* did not contradict the idea of fixed boundaries. It was a religious formula for the proper advance of the boundaries, establishing a "dynamic stability" in order of the state."

<sup>69</sup> Ernst Meyer, Roemischer Staat und Staatsgedanke, Zuerich und Muenchen: Artemis, 1975, p. 271.

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<sup>70</sup> Lintott, p. 17. "In both cases the quasi-legal ritual *deditio* was required by Rome, in which the other community placed itself unreservedly under Roman authority."

<sup>71</sup> William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 34-35. "It could be used in utterly specious ways, for example to justify helping the Mamertines in 264. It certainly was not an ideal which tended generally to restrain Rome from going to war."

<sup>72</sup> Lintott, p. 33.

<sup>73</sup> ---, Restraint and Limitations in Warfare: From Ancient Times to the Atomic Age, Fort Belvoir, VA: Headquarters, US Army Combat Developments Command, Historical Division, Directorate of Plans, 1964. p. 49-50.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>75</sup> Harris, p. 166. "Cf. Frank, Roman Imperialism, 9 (The fetial law shows that the Roman *mos maiorum* did not recognize the right of aggression or a desire for more territory as just causes for war.)"

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 167. "If Rome was actually attacked in serious fashion by an enemy, there was no opportunity to bring the fetial procedure into play. It was therefore essentially a mechanism for setting an attack in motion. The question is only whether the procedure, in its older form or its later one, somehow prevented Roman attacks that were not felt to be defensive in purpose."

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>79</sup> Everett L. Wheeler, "Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I," The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 1993. p. 8. "Thus reviews and reactions, though conceding Luttwak's achievement, roasted more than toasted the work and decried any "master plan" of Roman Strategy-a view distorting Luttwak's actual position. In some respects reaction to Luttwak recalls the German academic establishment's hostility to Hans Delbrück."

<sup>80</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 1.

<sup>81</sup> Wheeler, p. 8

<sup>82</sup> Whittaker, p. 6-7. "When we turn to American ancient historians, therefore, it is difficult to believe that the influential book by Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of

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the Roman Empire, was not in some respects affected by this tradition [Ratzel's political geography as social Darwinism] whether consciously or unconsciously. His evident admiration for the earliest phases of the Julio-Claudian expansion and for its period of what he calls "forceful suasion" leads him to compare unfavorably the static frontiers of later generations which he evidently regards as the beginning of the end. This is very much Turner's and Ratzel's mold of though, for they regarded the adventures of an expanding frontier as character building and saw consolidation as decline. To Luttwak, as to Turner, the indigenous frontier populations were an enemy to be intimidated but were nowhere part of the equation of frontier formation. No doubt this is because, as one reviewer has said of Luttwak's later book, *Strategy*, he studies strategy as military fighting, not as a political process."

Also see p. 11. "It is perhaps not surprising, then, to find that the whole subject of roman frontiers is riddled with paradox. First we find a state that-to use the words of a recent study-was "from the beginning a society of frontiers"; yet it was also a society where it is impossible, despite the best efforts of this same author, to detect anything like a frontier policy before the emperor Augustus... Second, we discover a society deeply committed from its very earliest laws to the juridical and sacral definitions of boundaries: yet it is virtually impossible at any given time either before or after Augustus to discover where the outer limits of those boundaries were drawn. The reason for these paradoxes lies not in the sparseness of the sources but in our own inadequate understanding of Roman cosmology and science."

<sup>83</sup> Lintott, p. 42.

<sup>84</sup> Whittaker, p. 200-201.

<sup>85</sup> Lintott, p. 42.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>87</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant, New York: Da Capo Press, 1965, p. 70.

<sup>88</sup> Polybius, Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, The Rise of the Roman Empire, New York: Penguin, 1979, p. 312. "12. The consuls, until such time as they are required to lead out the legions, remain in Rome and exercise supreme authority over all public affairs. All other magistrates with the exception of the tribunes are subordinate to them and are bound to obey them, and it is they who present foreign embassies to the Senate. Besides these duties they refer urgent business to the Senate for discussion and are entirely responsible for implementing its decisions. It is also their duty to supervise all those affairs of state which are administered by the people; in such cases they summon meetings of the popular assembly, introduce measures and execute the decrees of the people. As for preparations for war and the general conduct of operations in the field, their power is almost absolute. They are entitled to make whatever demands they consider appropriate upon the allies,

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appoint military tribunes, enroll soldiers and select those who are suitable for service. They also have the power to inflict punishment when on active service upon anyone under their command, and authority to spend any sum they think fit from the public funds; in this matter of finance they are accompanied by a quaestor, who complies wholly with their instruction. Thus if anyone were to consider this element in the constitution alone, he could reasonably say that it is a pure example of monarchy or kingship. Here I may add that any changes which may take place now or in the future in the functions I have just described, or am about to describe, do not alter the truth of my analysis."

<sup>89</sup> Fuller, p. 70-71. "Soon after it was passed [*Lex Vatinia de Caesaris Provincia*] occurred one of those strokes of good fortune which so frequently favored Caesar: Metellus Celer, when on his way to take over govenorship of Transalpine Gaul, suddenly died, and under pressure of the Assembly the province was allotted to Caesar - presumably on a five year basis - in addition to Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum."

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 73. "...Caesar received the startling news that the Helvetii intended to migrate into south- western Gaul by way of the Province, and that they had fixed upon March 28 as the day upon which their forces were to muster opposite Geneva, the first town of the Allobroges across the Helvetian border."

<sup>91</sup> Emilio Gabba, Republican Rome, The Army and the Allies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. p. 159-160. "On the other hand, emigration to Cisalpine Gaul and the western provinces was not a planned affair. Indeed, it is very likely that the settlement of Roman citizens and of *socii* outside the traditional limits was not looked on favorably. At some time in the second century BC which cannot be dated with any certainty (between 185 and 180 according to Toynbee, II 554 f.), the Roman government passed a law *de modo agrorum* concerning *ager publicus*, and this was intended to limit, at least on this type of land, the growth of large *latifundia*. It was the only possible measure, but made no appreciable difference."

<sup>92</sup> Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. p. 171.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>96</sup> William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. p. 105. "An obstacle to understanding which must be removed at once derives from the modern view that, during much or all of our period, the Senate was reluctant to *annex* territory....this conventional view is mistaken, and the Senate was perfectly willing to annex when it was possible and profitable to do so. But the point here is that even if the conventional view were correct and the rulers of Rome were reluctant to

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annex, none the less they may well have desired to increase the empire. The paradox in this is merely on the surface, for the Roman conception of the empire, as early as we know anything about it, was a realistic one: they usually thought of it *not* as being the area covered by the formally annexed provinces, but rather as consisting of all the places over which Rome exercised power. The earliest developments in terminology cannot be traced, but it is certain that the Romans had a clear notion of the power they exercised over their Italian allies, and very likely that by the last stage of the Italian wars they regarded all of Italy, in Polybius' phrase, as their private property. For a long time the *res Romana* grew with relatively little use of annexation, and when provinces began to be created beyond Italy, there were always states outside their boundaries which were more or less under Roman power."

<sup>97</sup> Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 12. "Principle among these were the Parthians. They had crushed M. Crassus in 53, when he had attempted to expand the Roman empire into Mesopotamia, and had subsequently invaded Syria, but in general they were not the first to use military force. Near the lower Danube a Dacian chief Burebista, later to be commemorated in Jordane's *History of the Getae*, had a formidable reputation but in fact did nothing to threaten Rome, though Pompey considered getting his aid in the civil war. The Germanic peoples offered little opposition to Caesar after Arioostus' defeat west of the Rhine in 58."

<sup>98</sup> Hans-Guenther Simon, "Eroberung und Verzicht. Die roemische Politik in Germanien zwischen 12 v. Chr. und 16 n. Chr.," Die Roemer in Hessen, pub. Dietwulf Baatz and Fritz-Rudolf Herrmann, Stuttgart: Theiss, 1982. p. 38.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 40. In 16 BC, Germanic tribes defeated portions of the Roman army along the lower Rhine region. In response, Augustus assumed personal responsibility for the reorganization of the province Gaul and security of its borders.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 40. The Rhine fortifications included: Mainz, Birten (near Xanten), Nijmegen and Vechten (near Utrecht). Vecten was the fleet base, while the others were legionary encampments.

<sup>101</sup> Theodor Mommsen, Roemische Geschichte, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976, Vol 5. p. 213. The policy of acquiring land for settlement and Roman expansion was the promulgation of a policy begun by Gracchus and embraced by Caesar. In its greater sense, this was an attempt to establish a rejuvenated Hellenistic-Italic nation.

<sup>102</sup> Simon, p. 40-41.

Compare: Ernst Kornemann, Roemische Geschichte, Vol. 2, "Die Kaiserzeit," Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener, 1970, p. 139.

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

Simon, p. 41.

Hermann Bengtson, Grundriss der römischen Geschichte, Mit Quellenkunde, Vol 1, Republik und Kaiserzeit bis 284 n. Chr., Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1970, p. 270.

<sup>105</sup> Kornemann, p. 144.

<sup>106</sup> Simon, p. 41.

<sup>107</sup> Kornemann, p. 140.

<sup>108</sup> Due to bad planning they were out of supplies, cp. Simon, p. 41

<sup>109</sup> Simon mentions the fact that Drusus was compared to Alexander the Great by an ancient historian. Like the famous conqueror, Drusus erected an alter on the banks of the river which marked the furthest extent of his campaign's success and the *Imperium Romanum*, before returning to the West. p. 42.

Compare: Mommsen, p. 37. Mommsen speculated that the Elbe served as a "*politische Reichsgrenze*" (political border of the imperium) while the Rhine was the "*Linie der Grenzverteidigung*" (line of defense).

<sup>110</sup> Mommsen, p. 37.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

Bengtson, p. 270.

<sup>113</sup> Kornemann, p. 143.

<sup>114</sup> Mommsen, p. 40.

<sup>115</sup> Luttwak, p. 57 and 60.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 56-57. "...modern commentators are undoubtedly right in stressing the tactical shortcomings of the camp defenses. It was certainly no part of Roman practice to man a beleaguered camp in the manner of a fortress: once assembled, the troops would march out to fight the enemy in the open, where the shock force of disciplined infantry

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could be brought to bear with full effect. (Only auxiliaries armed with missile weapons could fight at all usefully from behind the camp fence.) But it was the nontactical functions that made the Roman marching camp much more than a mere defensive perimeter and that gave it "a degree of importance without parallel in modern warfare." The marching camp was, in effect, a powerful psychological device."

<sup>117</sup> Limes as psychological barrier.

<sup>118</sup> Dyson, p. 4-5. "In all areas, the Romans found complex, changing societies and became involved in political, social, and economic processes whose roots often lay deep in the past. Too often Roman frontier historians, like American frontier historian, have tended to see frontier areas as *tabulae rasa*e where the imperial power could exercise its will freely. The previous inhabitants were seen either as obstacles to progress or as ephemeral entities who rapidly disappeared with the advance of the conqueror.

This approach is misleading. Rome was often drawn to a frontier because the local cultural and political dynamics affected their interests. We cannot understand why the Romans acted as they did if we do not know what cultural developments and events in a specific area led the Romans to intervene. Moreover, once the decision to intervene had been made, Roman success depended on a shrewd analysis of the nature of local conditions and of those forces that might favor Rome, as well as those that would oppose it. Again, this presupposes that both the Romans and historians reconstructing the actions of the Romans understand the local situation. It should also be remembered that one of the most impressive qualities of the Romans was their ability to build on existing social structure and to stress continuity in the creation of their own system. In most of the frontier areas under consideration, the Romans tried more to turn the natives into Romans than bring their own people into deserted lands."

Compare: Kornemann, p. 130.

<sup>119</sup> Luttwak, p. 74.

Compare: Whittaker, p. 77. The author takes a dim view of Luttwak's concept of the frontier as a "scientific defense." However, a case can be made that Whittaker misinterpreted Luttwak's use of the term scientific defense as demonstrated by his repeated claims that the actual position of the *limes* was frequently not opportunity positioned to conduct a defense. While that fact may be true, it is also irrelevant given that the nature of the limes was to respond to low-intensity threats and that the actual perimeter represented in effect a "line of departure" for subsequent Roman preemptive offensive operations of a large scale.

<sup>120</sup> Luttwak, p. 68.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>122</sup> Whittaker, p. 83-84.

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<sup>123</sup> Lintott, p. 42. "The empire thus remained for centuries open-ended geographically as well as conceptually, and even when in the second century AD it tended to become a fortress, remained permeable to outside influences. Indeed the frontier could be viewed as a controlled environment in which contact with the outside world could be facilitated."

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>125</sup> Meyer, Roem. Staat, p.388. This longevity of office differs dramatically from that of the Senatorial provinces, in which periods of service lasted on the average one year.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 389-392.

<sup>127</sup> Lintott, p.120. "We should not, however, proceed too confidently on this basis to talk of a grand strategy of the Roman empire. The bureaucracy characteristic of modern war ministries did not exist to elaborate policy, intelligence from beyond the frontiers was poor and communication, in spite of the *cursus publicus*, was comparatively slow. Hence, at the extremities of the empire military operations were frequently hasty responses to a sudden threat and the governors on the spot had to improvise. Yet it was possible to have a long-term policy or attitude, which could be incorporated into instructions to governors, and this would be confirmed over the years by conservatism. Moreover, decision might be taken about military recruitment and the raising of revenues which of necessity would set limits to territorial aims."

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 24-25. "Caesar's extension by conquest of the Transalpine Gallic province to included all 'Long-haired Gaul' has been taken as an example of a proconsul breaching the rules which bound Republican governors, but in fact it may simply be yet another illustration of the flexibility of the concept of *provincia*."

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 54-55.

<sup>130</sup> Hans-Guenther Simon, Die Zeit der Defensive. Die roemische Grenzpolitik zwischen 16 und 69 n. Chr. Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 63-65; Dietwulf Baatz, Roemische Eroberungen unter den flavischen Kaisern. Bau des Limes. Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 66-73.

<sup>131</sup> Mommsen, p.139.

<sup>132</sup> Kornemann, p.221. Baatz claims that although their main domain of settlement was that around today's Fritzlar and Kassel their sphere of influence extended as far as Mainz on the Rhine. Baatz, Der roemische Limes, p.15.

<sup>133</sup> Baatz gives a further reason for the emperor's quick military response: for political reasons he wanted a tangible military success early in his reign. Der roemische Limes, p.15.

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<sup>134</sup> Compare: Baatz, Roemische Eroberungen unter den flavischen Kaisern. Bau des Limes, in: Die Roemer in Hessen, p.73 for a listing of these legions.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 73. The Roman writer and participant of this campaign, Frontinus, serves as the main source of these operations. Frontinus, The Strategems and The Aqueducts of Rome. With an English translation by Charles E. Bennett. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. p.24-27.

<sup>136</sup> Frontinus, I. III. 10. Baatz' understanding of "limitibus" as 'paths' makes more sense than Bennett's translation as "frontier of the empire" (p. 27); Baatz claims "frontier" is the meaning of "limes" in later times. Der roemische Limes, p. 16. Similarly Mommsen, p.140, footnote 13.

<sup>137</sup> Baatz, Roem Eroberungen, in: Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 73.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p. 73-74.

<sup>139</sup> Baatz, Der roemische Limes, p. 16.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

Compare: Anne Johnson, Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 249-269.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 20. Tacitus, The Agricola and the Germania, Translated with an Introduction by H. Mattingly, London: Penguin Books, 1970. 29, p.126.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>144</sup> For example: building bridges, aqueducts, heating systems (hypocaustum), the use of cranes and .... Baatz, Das Leben im Grenzland des Roemerreichs, in: Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 107-110.

<sup>145</sup> Baatz, Roem. Eroberungen, p.76- 80.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 80. When just compensation was granted it must have been worthy of note; Frontinus reports about Domitian: " ...he ordered compensation to be made for the crops which he had included within his fortifications. Thus the renown of his justice won the allegiance of all." The Strategems , II. XI. 7.

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<sup>148</sup> Baatz, Der roemische Limes, p. 70.

<sup>149</sup> Compare: Kornemann, p.223, who points to the significance of the trade routes crossing the new provinces, i.e.. the one leading to the Black Sea, or the Rhine route north to the North Sea. Baatz claims that by far the most significant trade with the Germanic tribes took the route via the North and East Seas. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>150</sup> Baatz, Der roemische Limes, p. 69.

<sup>151</sup> Allowances were made for local legal customs and only persons with Roman citizenship could plead their cases in a 'Roman' court. But the numbers of provincials with dual citizenship increased steadily until all free men received the Roman citizenship in the *constitutio Antoniniana* 212 AD. Cp. Kornemann, p. 310.

<sup>152</sup> Meyer, p. 398-399.

<sup>153</sup> For more detailed information on trade, the economy, finance, technology and traffic, cp. Baatz, Das Leben im Grenzland des Roemerreichs, in: Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 93- 114.

<sup>154</sup> Baatz, Die Zeit der Defensive. Die roemische Grenzpolitik zwischen 16 und 69 n. Chr. p. 59, and Roem. Eroberungen. p. 69-70, both in: Die Roemer in Hessen. The author points to the fact that even a disapproving majority could not have stopped a tribal band as these raids were not considered dishonorable but rather good training for young warriors.

<sup>155</sup> Baatz, Das Leben im Grenzland, in: Die Roemer in Hessen, p. 155.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155-156. When these soldiers' homeland was attacked while they served in the Parther War (233 AD.), they forced the emperor to abruptly end that war so that they could return home and defend their own provinces.

<sup>157</sup> By giving signals, depending on the weather and visibility, either smoke or fire or horn signals. They might also wave a red signal flag. Cp. Baatz, Das Leben im Grenzland des Roemerreichs. In: Die Roemer In Hessen. p. 153-154.

<sup>158</sup> David Meyler, "Return to the Teutoburger," Command Magazine, Jan-Feb. 1994, p. 62-66.

<sup>159</sup> Lintott, p. 189.

<sup>160</sup> Whittaker, p. 223. "In the later Empire of the fourth century A.D. this separation was forgotten. It became increasingly common to employ native inhabitants from both sides of the frontiers as ethnic units in the army, frequently under their own chieftains, while at the same time more and more barbarians were admitted and settled within the

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frontier provinces, often on the borders. Social, economic, and cultural exchanges inevitably continued across the frontiers despite—or perhaps because of—the use of trading privileges as a political weapon. Within the Roman province, therefore, the "pull" of exchange increasingly created a frontier society that was fast becoming indistinguishable from that beyond."

<sup>161</sup> Luttwak, p. 128. "the empire now confronted the larger federation of the Franks and the Alamanni, who could concentrate much more man power in attacking the frontier."

<sup>162</sup> Whittaker, p. 224. "...like the Batavian *exploratores* at Roomburg near Leiden (CIL 13.8825) or the British *arcani* beyond the wall (Amm. Marc 28.3.8)."

<sup>163</sup> Luttwak., p. 145. "The Romans constantly watched the barbarians, but the barbarians also watched the Romans: with the frontier garrisons visibly depleted, they naturally saw new opportunities for profitable raiding."

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 132, 136. "As soon as Roman armies were able to force the enemy to revert to the defensive, or better yet, to resume a dependent client status, every attempt was made to restore the former system of preclusive security. This was the essence of Diocletian's military policy at the end of the third century and that of the more fortunate of his successors until Valentinian I (364-67), when the last sustained attempt to provide a preclusive defense of the imperial territory was made."

"The equilibrium characteristic of successful defense-in-depth strategies was not usually maintained for very long. There was a built-in tendency for the successful defense-in-depth to give way to a temporary restoration of the earlier strategy of forward defense; if the strategy proved unsuccessful, it gave way to an imposed "elastic defense." The goal of a successful defense-in-depth, ensuring the ultimate possession of imperial territory, was upgraded to the Antonine goal of preclusive protection for all imperial territory against threats at all levels of intensity."

<sup>166</sup> Whittaker, p. 202. Whittaker reinforces this point on pages 204-5. "Stilicho lost support disastrously when he was prepared to treat with Alaric's Goths in order to protect Italy, since the Roman upper class still believed the only way to treat barbarians was to crush them into unequal submission."

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 206. "There are as many, or more military buildings on the perimeter limites of the Rhine and the Danube dated to Constantine's reign as to that of Diocletian (Johnson 1983, 166; Petrickovits 1971, 182-87, 207-18.)"

Compare Luttwak, p. 159-166.

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p. 153. "It was not the Hadrianic system of preclusive security through a "forward defense" that was tested in the crisis of the third century, but only the empty shell of that system, stripped of its indispensable element of *tactical* mobility and deprived of its strategic elasticity. The Alamanni who broke through the Neckar valley and overran the overland *limes* of Upper Germany and Raetia by 260 were probably stronger than the Chatti whom Domitian had successfully driven beyond the Taunus, but it is certain that the imperial frontiers they attacked had become much weaker."

<sup>169</sup> Luttwak, p. 132.

<sup>170</sup> Baatz, Limes, p. 77-78.

<sup>171</sup> Luttwak, p. 132.

<sup>172</sup> Stephen Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1983, p. 136-168.

<sup>173</sup> Luttwak, p. 132-4.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 160. "In the wake of the great Alamannic invasion of Italy in 259-60, which the emperor Gallienus finally defeated at Milan, and the invasion of the Iuthungi a decade later, which Aurelian crushed in the Po valley, the defense of the transalpine roads became an important priority. its goal was erection of multiple barriers across the invasion corridors leading to northern Italy."

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 160. "At the opposite end of the imperial perimeter, in northwest Europe, equal care was taken to fortify important highways leading from frontiers to the interior. Under the principate, important highways had been lightly guarded by soldiers detached from their legions for these police duties (*befficiarii consularis*). But apart from the second half of the third century onward, both normal forts and small road forts (*burgi*) began to be built on the highways in the rear of the frontiers, as was the case on the Cologne-Tongres-Bavay road (which continued to the Channel coast at Boulogne), and the highways from Trier to Cologne and from Reims to Strasbourg."

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., p. 161. "These road forts and refuges also provided some security from a new internal threat: bands of brigands (*bagaudae*), the product of a society oppressive and exploitative even in near-collapse."

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., p. 155 and 159.

<sup>178</sup> Whittaker, p. 205. "It is wrong to think this was all bluff. Emperors believed their own propaganda. Valentinian died of apoplexy because the Quadi dared to claim it was provocation when he built fortifications in their territory (Amm. Marc. 30.62-3)."

<sup>179</sup> Luttwak, p. 178.

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 178 and 182. "It was seemingly under Constantine (306-37) that this system gave way to another, in which powerful mobile field forces were concentrated for empire-wide service, and the provincial forces were correspondingly reduced."

"A still further stage of disintegration is recorded in *Notia* lists for the much-ravaged middle Rhine sector, where under the command of the *Dux Mogontiacensis* we find eleven *praefecti* in charge of units that are mostly undifferentiated *milites*. One unit retains the mere memory of a legionary association (*Praefectus militum secundae Flaviae*); another unit's name recalls a function most probably defunct (*Praefectus militum balistariorum*). In the list it is clear that all are to be identified primarily by the place names appended to the titular-a symbol of the final localization of what had once been a purely mobile army."

Compare Whittaker, p. 207. "The growth of regional field armies (as opposed to Constantine's central, mobile force) could just as well have been the consequence of the divisions of the empire under these sons of Constantine. The army, that is, was divided regionally for political, not strategic reasons."

<sup>181</sup> Luttwak, p. 188.

<sup>182</sup> Whittaker, p. 224. "As so often, the *Historica Augusta* reflects fourth-century ideals when it recounts that the emperor Probus scattered sixteen thousand recruits in units (*numeri*) and frontier troops (*limitanei*) in different provinces, saying "that when the Roman was helped by barbarians it must be felt but not seen" (HA *Prob.* 14.7). That I think, was meant to be official policy..."

<sup>183</sup> Ardant du Picq, "Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battles," Trans. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton, Roots of Strategy, Book 2, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987, p. 66.

<sup>184</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 75.

<sup>185</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 6.

<sup>186</sup> Harris, p. 166-171. Here we refer to the *ius fetiale* and the Roman psychological need (reassurance) to engage in only just causes.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 20-26.

<sup>188</sup> This may not always seem apparent as, for example, Tacitus occasionally lumps several tribes under one name. He should be excused however given the limited amount of information available about the "barbarians" but more importantly due to the nature of tribal organization. As in many cultures today, the Germanic peoples consisted of several

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major tribes and each in turn was composed of a variety of smaller sub-tribes. The convoluted nature of the tribal structure combined with frequently nomadic movements could only exacerbate an understanding of the truth. However, once a "tribe" established contact with the Romans it acquired an identity and a recorded history by Roman diplomats and historians.

<sup>189</sup> FM 100-23, p. 6.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>191</sup> Meyler, p. 66.

<sup>192</sup> Whittaker, p. 21.

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